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RESURRECTING RETROGRESSION: 
WILL SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT REVIVE 
PRECLEARANCE NATIONWIDE? 
NOEL H. JOHNSON* 
The question is not whether the voting laws could be made more 
convenient — they virtually always can be. Rather, the question is 
whether the electoral system as applied treats protected classes the same 
as everyone else, determined by the totality of the circumstances.1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Voting Rights Act of 19652 is perhaps the most successful piece 
of civil rights legislation in this country’s history. Since its enactment, 
the law has been instrumental in removing discriminatory voting 
barriers that had long kept minorities from enjoying an equal 
opportunity to participate in the political process. 
However, the Voting Rights Act was significant for another reason: 
it fundamentally rearranged the constitutional order regarding control 
of elections. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act employed certain 
triggering formulas that required all or part of sixteen states to seek 
preclearance from the federal government before implementing any 
new election regulation. In effect, this gave the federal government 
veto power over states’ elections. 
This order remained in place until 2013, when the Supreme Court 
decided in Shelby County v. Holder3 that the triggering formula used to 
impose  preclearance  obligations  in  certain  parts  of  the  country was 
Copyright © 2017 Noel H. Johnson. 
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1.  N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 465 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
2.  52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–10508 (2014).
3.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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obsolete because it was based on decades-old voter registration data 
that did not reflect the current electoral landscape. 
Even though Shelby County rejected federal oversight of state 
elections through Section 5, a conscious effort has been made on 
several fronts to resurrect federal supremacy over state control of 
elections under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. However, instead of 
using traditional Section 2 standards as found in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, these efforts attempt to import bare statistical tests for 
liability that were previously utilized under Section 5 to block state 
election laws.4 
The standards under Section 5 and Section 2 are quite different. 
Section 5 employs a “retrogression” standard to block election law 
changes. That is, if the law diminishes the electoral clout of minority 
voters, even if by the barest of statistical margin, the law is blocked. 
Under Section 2, however, disparate impact does not determine 
liability. Rather, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances and 
asks whether the challenged practice has the real-world result of 
denying minorities an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral 
process. 
This new approach to litigation has thus far been employed in 
Wisconsin, Texas, Ohio, Virginia, and North Carolina to challenge a 
host of election-related measures such as voter photo identification 
laws, changes to early voting periods, same-day voter registration, and 
requirements that voters only vote in the precinct where they live. If 
the strategies advanced in these cases are not combatted, every state 
will risk violating the Voting Rights Act if any change to an election law 
has any statistical impact on a racial minority group. And the 
constitutional balance between the states and the federal government 
that the Supreme Court sought to restore in Shelby County will be 
undone. 
The courts undoubtedly have a role to play in safeguarding the 
voting rights of majority and minority peoples. That role, however, is to 
interpret the laws as they are written, not to opine on the “policy 
merits,” “desirability” or “popularity” of various voting measures and 
mechanisms or to weigh how such changes might tip the balance of 
political power. 
 
 
 4.  See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548 –49 (1969) (describing Section 5’s 
legal standard). 
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Courts hearing challenges under Section 2 must dispose of them 
under the appropriate legal standard. Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act requires much more than bare statistical disparities; it requires a 
searching inquiry into the real-world impact of a particular law on the 
opportunity of minority voters to cast a ballot, as viewed within the 
entire landscape of electoral opportunities. 
I.  HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Long before the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment or the 
Voting Rights Act, Congress granted the states the power to regulate 
their elections. The Constitution expressly provides states with the 
unilateral authority to determine who may vote.5 The states may also 
determine the times, places, and manner of holding their elections, so 
long as the governing regulations are not inconsistent with federal law.6 
As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the “Times, Places, and 
Manner” encompasses regulations “relating to ‘registration’” of voters.7 
With no legal prohibition against it, states exercised their authority 
to regulate elections in ways that overwhelmingly excluded minorities 
from political decision-making.8 In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment 
granted African American men the right to vote, mandating that the 
“right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude.”9 However, what followed was 
decades of “unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution” in 
certain areas of the country.10 
Some states11 continued to erect barriers to deny the franchise to 
African Americans. These included “grandfather clauses,12 property 
 
 5.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (allowing election of Representatives), U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVII (allowing election of Senators) U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (allowing presidential electors 
chosen as directed by state legislatures).   
  6. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Arizona v. Inter-Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc. (ITCA), 
133 S. Ct. 2247, 2254 (2013) (Congress’s regulations “supersede those of the State which are 
inconsistent therewith.”).   
 7.  ITCA, 133 S. Ct. at 2253 (internal citations omitted). 
 8.  See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 937 (1995) (stating that there was “almost 
absolute exclusion of the Negro voice in state and federal elections”). 
 9.  U.S. CONST., amend. XV, § 1. 
 10.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). 
 11.  See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013) (“In the 1890s, Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia began to enact 
literacy tests for voter registration and to employ other methods designed to prevent African-
Americans from voting.”). 
 12.  After the Fifteenth Amendment extended the right to vote to African American men, 
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qualifications, ‘good character’ tests, and the requirement that 
registrants ‘understand’ or ‘interpret’ certain matter.”13 “[B]lacks were 
given more difficult questions, such as the number of bubbles in a soap 
bar, the news contained in a copy of the Peking Daily, the meaning of 
obscure passages in state constitutions, and the definition of terms such 
as habeas corpus.”14 White registrants were not given the same tests and 
thus the voter registration process was not equally accessible.15 
Despite mechanisms to challenge these practices, the courts 
provided little help. Some jurisdictions were able to “stay[] one step 
ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws 
as soon as the old ones had been struck down,”16 forcing a plaintiff to 
file a new lawsuit, which was “usually onerous to prepare.”17 
Following years of ineffective, piecemeal litigation, Congress 
passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
II.  SECTIONS 5 AND 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
A.  Section 5 – Preclearance and the Statistical Retrogression Standard 
Section 5 requires all jurisdictions covered by Section 4’s coverage 
formula18 to get approval from the federal government for—or 
preclear—“any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.”19 Preclearance 
may be sought from either the Attorney General or through a 
declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia.20 
 
some states enacted “burdensome requirements for registration.” See Louisiana v. United States, 
380 U.S. 145, 148 (1965). However, these new requirements contained exemptions for “any person 
who had been entitled to vote before January 1, 1867, or who was the son or grandson of such a 
person.” Id. By operation, these “grandfather clauses” exempted only white voters. 
 13.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 311.  
 14.  Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 297 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
 15.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 312 (“White applicants for registration have often been excused 
altogether from the literacy and understanding tests or have been given easy versions have 
received extensive help from voting officials, and have been registered despite serious errors in 
their answers.”). 
 16.  Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976). 
 17.  Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314. 
 18.  At the time of the Voting Rights Act’s passage, the jurisdictions subjected to 
preclearance included Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia as 
well as 39 counties in North Carolina and one in Arizona. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 
2620 (2013). 
 19.  The Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a). 
 20.  Id. 
JOHNSON FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2017  12:26 PM 
2017] RESURRECTING RETROGRESSION 5 
Section 5 was designed to “remedy[] the effects of prior intentional 
racial discrimination.”21 Because reactive litigation had proved 
ineffective, Congress decided “to shift the advantage of time and inertia 
from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim.”22 Despite its noble 
intentions, Section 5 was not without constitutional concerns. “Section 
5 is a unique requirement that exacts significant federalism costs,”23 in 
the way of “drastic” interference with the States’ sovereignty to “give 
effect to their policy choices affecting voting.”24 Nevertheless, the Act’s 
preclearance obligations were upheld under by the Supreme Court as 
a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment.25 According to the Court, the “extraordinary stratagem 
of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of 
perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court 
decrees,” created “exceptional conditions” that justified intrusion into 
areas of state sovereignty.26 
Section 5’s preclearance mechanism uses a retrogression standard.27 
That means that a jurisdiction submitting a law for preclearance must 
affirmatively demonstrate that the law will have no negative statistical 
impact on the electoral ability of minority voters. 
Sections 4 and 5 were intended by Congress to be temporary 
measures and were set by statute to expire after five years.28 However, 
Congress reauthorized them for an additional five years.29 Congress 
would reauthorize Sections 4 and 5 an additional three times prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County.30In 2006, Sections 5 
 
 21.  Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 22.  Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 23.  Lopez, 525 U.S. at 293 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (collecting cases discussing this issue). 
 24.  Id. at 294. Justice Powell described Section 5’s “encroachment” on state sovereignty as 
“especially troubling because it destroys local control of the means of self-government, one of the 
central values of our polity.” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201 (1980). 
 25.  The Fifteenth Amendment provides, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude,” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1, and grants Congress the “power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Id. § 2. 
 26.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966). 
 27.  See generally Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (Justice O’Connor joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy concluded that “Creation of [the] District . . . (only) was 
not justified by a compelling state interest in complying with VRA § 5, which seeks to prevent 
voting-procedure changes leading to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise”). 
 28.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 2620–21. The Voting Rights Act was reauthorized for seven more years in 1975, 
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was not just reauthorized, it was amended to “prohibit more conduct 
than before.”31 The amended Section 5 more narrowly defined when an 
objection to a state voting law change is justified: 
(b) Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice, or procedure with respect to voting that has the purpose of 
or will have the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of 
the United States on account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), to elect their preferred 
candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote within the 
meaning of subsection (a) of this section.32 
In practice, the Department of Justice or the court would look to 
the status quo and then analyze whether the new change in the law 
would diminish the electoral strength of minorities.33 If there was any 
such diminishment, the proposed change was blocked: “In § 5 
preclearance proceedings . . . the baseline is the status quo that is 
proposed to be changed: If the change ‘abridges the right to vote’ 
relative to the status quo, preclearance is denied . . . .”34 
Section 5 “imposes upon a covered jurisdiction the difficult burden 
of proving the absence of discriminatory purpose and effect.”35 The 
Department of Justice was not required to show the extent or existence 
of diminishment.36 If the jurisdiction could not show through 
quantitative evidence that the proposed change in its election laws 
would have no negative effect whatsoever on minorities, that change 
would not be precleared.37 
After the 2006 amendments, Section 5 was interpreted by the 
Department of Justice in such a way that bare statistical evidence of 
retrogression automatically froze any change to state election practices. 
Submissions were often blocked when no evidence of retrogression was 
presented, simply because the submitting jurisdiction could not prove 
the total absence of any discriminatory effect.38 Furthermore, any 
 
for 25 more years in 1982, and for 25 more years in 2006. Id. 
 31.  Id at 2621. 
 32.  52 U.S.C. § 10304.  
 33.  See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2586 (1994) (“Under § 5, then, the 
proposed voting practice is measured against the existing voting practice to determine whether 
retrogression would result from the proposed change.”). 
 34.  Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd. (Reno II), 528 U.S. 320, 334 (2000).  
 35.  Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd. (Reno I), 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997).  
 36.  Reno II, 528 U.S. at 334.  
 37.  Id. at 336. 
 38.  See, e.g., Objection Letter of Loretta King, Assistant Attorney General, to Thurbert E. 
Baker, Attorney General of Georgia (May 29, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/crt/records/vot 
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ambiguity weighed against the jurisdiction.39 Importantly, there was no 
consideration given to the totality of the circumstances or any non-
discriminatory factors or reasons for the change in election 
procedures.40 
South Carolina’s effort to enact a voter identification law provides 
a prime example of how Section 5’s statistical hair-trigger worked to 
stonewall state election law changes. In 2011, the Department of Justice 
interposed an objection to South Carolina’s law on the basis of a 1.6% 
difference in ownership of photo identification between white and 
black voters.41 In the opinion of the Department, this small statistical 
difference in likely ID ownership was enough to interpose an objection 
because it allegedly “diminished” the electoral power of minorities. 
The statistical disparity in ownership cited by the Department of 
Justice is, of course, not a finding that anyone was actually denied the 
right to vote. But under Section 5’s retrogression standard, it was 
sufficient to lodge an objection. 
With its law blocked, South Carolina was forced to file a lawsuit to 
obtain preclearance. The reviewing court noted that South Carolina’s 
law included a “reasonable impediment” exception, which allowed 
voters lacking qualifying identification to vote after “simply . . . 
sign[ing] an affidavit at the polling place and list[ing] the reason that 
they have not obtained a photo ID.”42 The “reasonable impediment” 
exception seemingly made no difference to the Department. Yet it 
became the basis for preclearance in federal court.43 
The Department of Justice used the 2006 amendments to Section 5 
to wield veto power over state election laws using the smallest 
statistical disparities. 
B.  Section 2 – Gingles and the Totality of Circumstances Standard 
Unlike Section 5, Section 2 applies nationwide and functions as a 
ban on racial discrimination in voting, with enforcement accomplished 
through litigation in federal court. Section 2 forbids any “standard, 
 
/obj_letters/letters/GA/1_090529.pdf. 
 39.  McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 257 (1984). 
 40.  See, e.g., LaRoque v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777, 794 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 41.  Objection Letter of Thomas Perez, Assistant Attorney General, to C. Havird Jones, Jr., 
Esq., Assistant Deputy Attorney General of South Carolina at 2 (Dec. 23, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/records/vot/obj_letters/letters/SC/l_111223.pdf.  
 42.  South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 43.  Id. 
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practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgment of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color.”44 As originally enacted, Section 2 banned only election laws that 
were enacted with racially discriminatory intent.45 However, 
amendments to the law in 1982 expanded its reach to laws that have 
racially discriminatory results, subject to a broad, totality-of-the-
circumstances standard.46 
Section 2 states: 
(a)  No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees 
set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b). 
(b)  A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the 
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes 
leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate 
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 
The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected 
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance 
which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section 
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in 
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.47 
The so-called “results prong” of Section 2 was first interpreted by 
the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,48 which involved a 
challenge to North Carolina’s legislative redistricting plan.49 Gingles 
provides the central guidance for courts addressing Section 2 
challenges.50 
The Gingles Court set forth a standard by which certain factors 
must be present in order to meet the “totality of the circumstances” 
 
 44.  52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
 45.  City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980). 
 46.  S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 117, 206–07 
[hereinafter Senate Report]. 
 47.  52 U.S.C.S. § 10301.  
 48.  478 U.S. 30 (1986).  
 49.  Id. at 34.  
 50.  See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 
997, 1011–13 (1994). 
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standard of Section 2 and to find that a violation has occurred. These 
factors were taken from the Senate Judiciary Committee’s majority 
report on the 1982 amendment to Section 2 and they include: 
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the 
jurisdiction that touched the right of minorities to register, 
vote, or otherwise participate in the electoral process; 
2. The extent to which voting in elections is racially polarized; 
3. The extent to which the jurisdiction has used unusually 
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-
single shot provisions, or other voting practices that may 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination; 
4. Whether minority candidates have been denied access to 
any candidate slating process; 
5. The extent to which minorities in the jurisdiction bear the 
effects of discrimination in education, employment, and 
health that hinder their ability to participate effectively in 
the political process; 
6. “Whether political campaigns have been characterized by 
overt or subtle racial appeals;” 
7. The extent to which minorities have been elected to public 
office.51 
While some of the analysis in Gingles might apply only in the 
reapportionment context, two central thresholds can be discerned for 
all Section 2 claims. First, the plaintiff must show that a discriminatory 
effect came about “on account of” race.52 There must be some causal 
nexus between the supposed statistical retrogression and some 
concrete indicia of discrimination, such as one or more of the Senate 
factors. Second, the disparate impact must result in actual real world 
unequal access to the political process.53 Ultimately, a plaintiff must do 
more than show a statistical difference in how an election law impacts 
minority voters by demonstrating how the election law actually impairs 
access to the electoral process.54 
 
 
 51.  Senate Report, supra note 46, at 28−29. 
 52.  52 U.S.C § 10301(a). 
 53.  See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) (explaining that the “critical question” 
under Section 2 is whether the contested law “results” in “less opportunity” for minority voters). 
 54.  See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014) (Section 2 “does not condemn a 
voting practice just because it has a disparate effect on minorities.”). 
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If, based on the totality of the circumstances, a plaintiff can show 
that the statistical differences were generated by one or more of the 
Senate factors or other indicia of discrimination that result in unequal 
access to the political process, then Section 2 is violated.55 A plaintiff 
must show some causality between disparate treatment, disparate 
impact, and a demonstrable impact on actual election outcomes. If 
Section 2 liability were to lie in simple statistical disparity, absent 
causality and unsupported by a broad non-quantitative body of 
evidence, then that version of Section 2 may well face serious 
constitutional challenge in light of Shelby County. In addition, if 
plaintiffs were not required to show some close nexus between 
statistical retrogression and actual disparate treatment and electoral 
results, then the words “totality of the circumstances” and “on account 
of” in Section 2 would be without meaning. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT RULES THAT SECTION 5 IS 
UNENFORCEABLE. 
On June 25, 2013, the United States Supreme Court held in Shelby 
County v. Holder that it is unconstitutional to use the coverage formula 
in Section 4(b) of the Voting Right Act to determine which jurisdictions 
are subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5.56 Section 4’s 
triggering formulas were based on turnout data from 1964, 1968, and 
1972.57 Data this old, said the Court, could no longer justify “‘federal 
intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.’”58 
If Congress had started from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not 
have enacted the present coverage formula. It would have been 
irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in such a 
fundamental way based on 40-year-old  data, when today’s statistics 
tell an entirely different story.59 
The Court went on to cast doubt on Section 5 itself. 
Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions. 
Such a formula is an initial prerequisite to a determination that 
exceptional conditions still exist justifying such an “extraordinary 
departure from the traditional course of relations between the 
States and the Federal Government.” Our country has changed, and 
 
 55.  Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44–46, 50–51. 
 56.  133 S. Ct. 2612, 31 (2013).  
 57.  Id. at 2619 20. 
 58.  Id. at 2624 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)). 
 59.  Id. at 2630 31. 
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while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must 
ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks 
to current conditions.60 
Thus, should Congress choose to revert to a preclearance regime, it 
must demonstrate that the “exceptional conditions” that justified the 
Voting Rights Act in 1965 still exist today. It is doubtful that such a 
showing could be made in light of the current registration and turnout 
rates of minority voters, some of which now outpace those of white 
voters.61 It is also doubtful that “current conditions” can continue to 
justify the use of a bare statistical hair-trigger to intrude into “sensitive 
areas of state and local policymaking.’”62 
IV.  RESURRECTING RETROGRESSION IN SECTION 2 CASES. 
The Supreme Court’s statements in Shelby County fell on deaf ears 
at the Department of Justice, which, along with other aligned 
organizations proceeded to resurrect Section 5 under the guise of 
Section 2. Using a similar new strategy, lawsuits have been waged in 
Texas, North Carolina, Virginia, Ohio, and Wisconsin, challenging 
measures designed to increase voter confidence and protect the 
integrity of our elections. Some courts have unfortunately been willing 
to graft Section 5 retrogression principles onto Section 2, while others 
have prudently recognized that Section 2 requires much more than bare 
statistical disparities. A survey of these cases follows below. 
A.  Texas 
Two months after the Supreme Court decided Shelby County, the 
Department of Justice filed a challenge to Texas’s voter photo 
identification law as a violation of Section 2.63 After three additional 
actions were filed by private plaintiff groups, the cases were 
consolidated for decision in Veasey v. Perry.64 The challenges were 
 
 60.  Id. at 2631 (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm., 502 U.S. 491, 500 501 (1992)). 
 61.  See, e.g., Rachel Weiner, Black Voters Turned Out at Higher Rate Than White Voters in 
2012 and 2008, WASH. POST. (Apr. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2013/04/29/black-turnout-was-higher-than-white-turnout-in-2012-and-2008/?utm_term=. 
db24af98944e. 
 62.  Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (quoting Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282). 
 63.  United States v. Texas, No. 2:13-cv-00263 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2013), consolidated for 
decision in Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).  
 64.  71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 632 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (consolidating United States v. Texas, No. 13-
cv-00263 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2013); Veasey v. Abbott, No. 2:13:-cv-00193 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2013; 
Texas State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Steen, No. 2:13-cv-00291 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 
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based on alleged disparities in identification ownership among white 
and black and Hispanic voters: “Upon information and belief, Hispanic 
and African-American voters in Texas, as compared to Anglo voters, 
disproportionately lack the forms of photo ID required by SB 14.”65 
SB 14 required voters to present photo identification when voting 
at the polls in person.66 The statute permitted a number of forms of 
identification, including a driver’s license, personal ID card, or license 
to carry a concealed handgun issued by the Texas Department of Public 
Safety (“DPS”), a United States military ID card, a United States 
citizenship certificate containing a photo or a passport.67 If the voter 
did not have one of these forms of identification, he or she could have 
obtained a free election identification certificate from the DPS. Voters 
suffering from a disability were exempt from the requirement to have 
photo identification.68 
In analyzing the results prong of Section 2, the district court in 
Veasey relied very heavily on the statistical disparity in current 
ownership of an acceptable form of identification: 
Assigning his data the ethnicity information used in the SSVR,69 
Dr. Ansolabehere found that 5.8% of all SSVR voters lacked 
qualified SB 14 ID compared to 4.1% of non-SSVR registered 
voters—a pool including Anglos, African-Americans and all other 
races. This 1.7% difference is statistically significant.70 
Upon this, and other bare statistical disparities, the court then 
purported to apply Gingles: 
In vote denial cases, a two-part analysis is conducted under the 
‘totality of the circumstances’ test. First, a court determines whether 
the law has a disparate impact on minorities. Second, if a disparate 
impact is established, the court assesses whether that impact is 
caused by or linked to social and historical conditions that currently 
or in the past produced discrimination against members of the 
protected class.71 
 
 
2013); and Ortiz v. Texas, No. 2:13-cv-00348 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2013)). 
 65.  Complaint at ¶ 35-37, United States. v. Texas, No. 13-cv-00263 (S.D. Tex. Aug 22 2013).  
 66.  S.B. 14, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  SSVR stands for the “Spanish Surname Voter Registration” list. See Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 
3d at 661.  
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id. at 694 95.  
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The court’s citation to Gingles does not support the “disparate 
impact” analysis the court believes it does. Gingles makes no mention 
of disparate impact. Instead, true to the text of Section 2, Gingles says: 
[T]he “right” question . . . is whether “as a result of the challenged 
practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to 
participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their 
choice. . . . In order to answer this question, a court must assess the 
impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral 
opportunities “on the basis of objective factors.”72 
The only reference to “impact” in this passage refers to the impact 
on real-world “electoral opportunities,” not the bare statistical impact 
estimated by the challengers’ statisticians during litigation. 
The court did not address the fact that there was no barrier in the 
law on the basis of race to obtain photo identification. Indeed, no such 
racial barriers exist in the law. Instead, the law grants every Texas 
resident the same opportunity to obtain the identification necessary to 
vote. Stated in terms of Section 2, members of minority groups do not 
“have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice” as a result of the requirement that they show identification 
prior to voting.73 
The district court’s finding that SB 14 violates Section 2 was 
ultimately affirmed by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.74 The Fifth 
Circuit adopted the lower court’s two part test despite its departure 
from the “totality of circumstances” inquiry mandated by Gingles.75 
Gingles does not bless a statistical exercise tripping Section 2 liability 
whenever an election process law, equally open to all and facially race 
neutral, has some theoretical (and de minimis) statistical difference in 
how the law impacts racial subgroups. This de minimis statistical 
standard to find a violation of Section 2 is synonymous with the 
standard used to justify an objection under Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, which asked only whether the change in law would have a 
retrogressive effect on minorities. 
“Retrogression is not the inquiry in § 2 dilution cases.”76 Nor is it 
the proper standard to apply in vote denial cases. The plain language of 
 
 72.  Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986).  
 73.  52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012). 
 74.  Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  
 75.  Id. at 243. 
 76.  Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 884 (1994). 
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Section 2 mandates an inquiry into the real-world impact on the 
electoral opportunity of minority groups. Statistical impact does not 
equate to opportunity. The Veasey courts’ analyses strayed from the 
language of Section 2 and the teachings of Gingles. 
The Supreme Court declined to review the lower courts’ decision 
on January 23, 2017, citing the interlocutory posture of certain claims as 
the reason for its refusal.77 However, the Court hinted that it would 
accept review at a later time.78 
B.  Wisconsin 
The reviewing court in Frank v. Walker79 strayed even further from 
Gingles than did the courts in Veasey. Like Veasey, Frank involved a 
Section 2 challenge to the photo identification law (Act 23) enacted by 
the Wisconsin Legislature in 2011.80 The Frank Court dispensed with 
Gingles almost entirely, adopting instead a test that relies explicitly on 
disparate impact. 
I conclude that Section 2 protects against a voting practice that 
creates a barrier to voting that is more likely to appear in the path 
of a voter if that voter is a member of a minority group than if he or 
she is not. The presence of a barrier that has this kind of 
disproportionate impact prevents the political process from being 
“equally open” to all and results in members of the minority group 
having “less opportunity” to participate in the political process and 
to elect representatives of their choice.81 
The version of Section 2 that the Frank court endorses demands 
perfect racial neutrality in all election law changes. Though sometimes 
difficult to quantify, election law changes will undoubtedly impact some 
racial group, including whites, to a degree greater than other groups. 
For example, changing the polling location inside a given precinct will, 
at least to some degree, impact one racial group more than another. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine any election law change that could satisfy 
the Frank court’s standard if challenged. 
 
 77.  See Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612, 613 (2017) (“Although there is no barrier to our 
review, the discriminatory purpose claim is in an interlocutory posture, having been remanded 
for further consideration. As for the §2 claim, the District Court has yet to enter a final remedial 
order. Petitioners may raise either or both issues again after entry of final judgment. The issues 
will be better suited for certiorari review at that time.”). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014).  
 80.  Id. at 842.  
 81.  Id. at 870. 
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit repudiated the district court’s 
reliance on disparate impact, explaining, “Section 2(b) tells us that 
§2(a) does not condemn a voting practice just because it has a disparate 
effect on minorities.82 Rather, Section 2 requires evidence that the right 
to vote has been denied on account of race. Act 23 did “not draw any 
line by race,” and there was no evidence demonstrating “that blacks or 
Latinos have less ‘opportunity’ than whites to get photo IDs.”83 Rather, 
what the lower court found was that “because they have lower income, 
these groups are less likely to use that opportunity. And that does not 
violate §2.”84 
The challengers did not show that the right to vote had been 
“denied” as Section 2 requires. “[U]nless Wisconsin makes it needlessly 
hard to get photo ID, it has not denied anything to any voter.”85 
The Seventh Circuit also prudently recognized that the “totality of 
the circumstances” inquiry mandated by Section 2 actually requires an 
inquiry into the “totality of circumstances” bearing on the voting rights 
of minorities. That is, electoral “opportunity” under Section 2 cannot 
be considered on the basis of a single voting change “in isolation,” but 
must be considered on the basis of the “entire voting and registration 
system.”86 To review each piece of legislation on disparate impact in 
“isolation” could “dismantle every state’s voting apparatus.”87 
At oral argument, the logic behind the challengers’ new approach 
to litigating Section 2 claims under Section 5 standards was on full 
display.  
[C]ounsel for one of the two groups of plaintiffs made explicit what 
the district judge’s approach implies: that if whites are 2% more 
likely to register than are blacks, then the registration system top to 
bottom violates §2; and if white turnout on election day is 2% 
higher, then the requirement of in-person voting violates §2.88  
The Seventh Circuit found such a reading of Section 2 to be 
“implausible,” noting that under such a theory that the designation of 
motor-vehicle agencies as registration locations would be unlawful if it 
was shown that minorities were less likely to own automobiles and 
 
 82.  Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 753. 
 86.  Id. at 753. 
 87.  Id. at 754. 
 88.  Id. 
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therefore less likely to need drivers’ licenses.89 “It is better to 
understand §2(b) as an equal-treatment requirement (which is how it 
reads) than as an equal-outcome command (which is how the district 
court took it).”90 
In practice, the versions of Section 2 employed by the Fifth Circuit 
and the Frank district court can effectively be used to turn any 
statistical disparity regarding the use of electoral procedures by 
different racial groups into an unlawful, discriminatory “effect” simply 
by pointing to a general history of discrimination within the challenged 
jurisdiction. It is difficult to imagine any voting change that could 
survive under such a relaxed application of the Voting Rights Act. 
C.  North Carolina 
The aforementioned lawsuits were pre-enforcement challenges. 
That is, the challenges were brought prior to the laws’ enforcement and 
sought to preliminarily enjoin the laws before they could go into effect 
and produce the discriminatory results the challengers alleged they 
would produce. 
The litigation in North Carolina,91 however, has involved both pre- 
and post-enforcement challenges under Section 2, providing the 
reviewing court with a rare chance to assess the real-world impact of 
the election law change on the electoral opportunities of minorities. 
The post-enforcement reality was far different from the outcome the 
challengers predicted would occur absent relief from the court. In other 
words, in North Carolina, the bare statistical disparities offered by the 
challengers were not a successful predictor of the actual effects of the 
law on minority voters. 
Following the Shelby County decision, North Carolina enacted SL 
2013-381, which provided for several changes to North Carolina 
election procedure, including 
• a requirement that voters present some form of photo 
identification prior to voting in person; 
• elimination of the ability to register to vote and to vote 
simultaneously (same-day registration); 
 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 338 
(M.D.N.C. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of North Carolina 
v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014), stayed in North Carolina v. League of Women 
Voters of North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014). 
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• a reduction in the number of days one could vote in person 
before election day from 17 days to 10 days; 
• a requirement that voters to cast ballots in the precinct 
where they actually lived; and, 
• eliminated the ability of 16 and 17 year-olds to register to 
vote.92 
Plaintiffs sought an injunction on Section 2 grounds against the 
elimination of same-day registration (SDR). At the outset, the 
McCrory court rejected any analysis under Section 2 that incorporated 
Section 5’s retrogression standard: 
[T]he court is not concerned with whether the elimination of SDR 
will “worsen the position of minority voters in comparison to the 
preexisting voting standard, practice, or procedure,” . . . a Section 5 
inquiry, but whether North Carolina’s existing voting scheme 
(without SDR) interacts with past discrimination and present 
conditions to cause a discriminatory result.93 
To meet their burden, Plaintiffs, like the other challengers, 
“presented unrebutted testimony that black North Carolinians have 
used SDR at a higher rate than whites in the three federal elections 
during which SDR was offered.”94 However, following the textual 
mandates of Section 2, the court looked beyond the change to same-
day registration and assessed the “totality of circumstances” related to 
black registration. The court noted the high registration rate of black 
North Carolinians (95.3%) and the fact that black registration 
presently eclipsed white registration by 7.5 percentage points.95 
Plaintiffs’ experts, not surprisingly, credited SDR for producing such 
high registration rates and predicted that without SDR, black 
registration would plunge by 3 percent.96 
Yet, under the “totality of the circumstances,” the plaintiffs could 
not demonstrate what mattered— unequal access to the polls. The court 
noted the numerous other ways residents could register to vote, 
including the option to register by mail.97 No plaintiff could 
 
 92.  Voter Information Verification Act, ch. SL 2013-381, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws (2013). 
 93.  N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 352; see also id. at 351 (“Section 2 
does not incorporate a ‘retrogression’ standard.”); id. at 348 (“Section 2 asks “whether the current 
electoral law interacts with historical discrimination and social conditions to cause black voters to 
have unequal access to the polls.”). 
 94.  Id. at 348–49. 
 95.  Id. at 350.   
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 350–351. 
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demonstrate “how these various other options failed to provide an 
equal opportunity to any black voter who otherwise wished to use 
SDR.”98 The simple fact that black “voters preferred to use SDR over 
these methods does not mean that without SDR voters lack equal 
opportunity.”99 
McCrory would travel all the way to the Supreme Court before 
arriving back at the district court for a trial on the merits.100 A decision 
by the Supreme Court staying an injunction by the Fourth Circuit 
allowed all of the challenged provisions to remain in effect for the 2014 
election. These circumstances allowed the district court to assess on 
remand the real-world impact of North Carolina’s changes in voting 
procedure. 
Following remand, the district court conducted 21 “extensive” days 
of trial on Plaintiffs’ claims.101 On April 25, 2016, the district court 
issued a 186-page opinion, rejecting all Section 2 attacks on the 
challenged provisions, as well as all other legal theories advanced by 
the plaintiffs. 
Following guidance from the Fourth Circuit, the court stated the 
Section 2 inquiry as a two-element test: 
(1) whether the specific election changes, individually and 
cumulatively, “impose a discriminatory burden” on African 
Americans and Hispanics in North Carolina, such that they “have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate 
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice”; 
and 
(2) whether the “discriminatory burden” is “caused by or linked to 
social and historical conditions that have or currently produce 
discrimination against” African Americans and Hispanics.102 
Consistent with the text, the court prudently recognized that what 
matters in the end is “opportunity,” judged on the basis of the totality 
of the circumstances. For that reason, the court found that “‘the relative 
ability  of  [minority]  voters  to  vote  through  the  remaining  options  
 
 
 
 98.  Id. at 351. 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  North Carolina v. League of Women Voters, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014). 
 101.  N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 331 (M.D.N.C. 2016) 
 102.  Id. at 465 (quoting League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 
240 (4th Cir. 2014)). 
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available’ under SL 2013-381 is relevant to whether they have an equal 
opportunity to participate in the political process.”103 
The court proceeded to address each of the Gingles factors in turn, 
analyzing to what extent each factor aided the plaintiffs’ claims.104 
Consistent with the new approach to Section 2, Plaintiffs’ experts 
offered statistics showing “disproportionate use” of the eliminated 
mechanisms as evidence that SL 2013-381 would ultimately result in 
inequality of opportunity for minority voters.105 More pointedly, the 
“[p]laintiffs claim[ed] disproportionate use reflects need.”106 
Plaintiffs’ approach was fundamentally flawed in at least one 
aspect. Disproportionate use statistics are merely a tool that permits a 
prediction as to the effects of the challenged law. For this reason, they 
are “less probative”107 of the laws’ actual effects. Because SL 2013-381 
was in effect for the 2014 election, the court was able to “stop 
speculating and observe real life results.”108 The actual “results” showed 
that “African Americans fared better in terms of registration and 
turnout rates in 2014, after the challenged mechanisms were eliminated, 
than in 2010, when they were in place.”109 
To be sure, voting prior to SL 2013-381 might have been more 
convenient for some. However, “the question is not whether the voting 
law could be made more convenient — they virtually always can be. 
Rather, the question is whether the electoral system as applied treats 
protected classes the same as everyone else, determined by the totality 
of the circumstances.”110 Under the totality of the circumstances, black 
“North Carolinians not only did not backslide under the new law, but 
rather continued to increase their participation.”111 Clearly the data 
suggest that minorities are “more adaptable than Plaintiffs 
claim[ed]”112 they would be under the new law. 
 
 
 103.  Id. (quoting Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 556 (6th Cir. 
2014)). 
 104.  See generally N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 422–65. 
 105.  Id. at 422. 
 106.  Id. at 480. 
 107.  Id. at 425. 
 108.  Id. at 487. 
 109.  See id. (“In fact, not only did African American turnout increase at a greater rate than 
other groups’ turnout in 2014 with SL 2013-381 in place, but that general election saw the smallest 
white-African American turnout disparity in any midterm election from 2002 to 2014.”). 
 110.  Id. at 465. 
 111.  Id. at 485. 
 112.  Id. at 476. 
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It is worth mentioning that North Carolina’s voter identification 
law bore a striking resemblance to the law precleared under Section 5 
in South Carolina, in so far as it included a “reasonable impediment” 
exception. Voters who could not obtain an acceptable form of 
identification “need only complete two forms” in order to cast a ballot 
in North Carolina.113 It is simply untenable to maintain that such system 
“denies” anyone the right to vote on account of race. 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered the lower court 
to “permanently enjoin all of the challenged provisions, including the 
photo ID provision.”114 The court skipped right over Section 2’s 
“results” prong and held that the “North Carolina General Assembly 
enacted the challenged provisions of the law with discriminatory 
intent.”115 While Section 2’s “intent” prong is beyond the scope of this 
article, the Fourth Circuit’s use of disparate impact to find such intent 
merits a few comments. 
Prior to enacting SL 2013-381, “the legislature requested data on 
the use, by race, of a number of voting practices.”116 Because the 
legislature then proceeded to modify election mechanism, which the 
data showed were disproportionately used by African Americans, the 
court determined that the legislature’s actions could be explained only 
by “intentional racial discrimination.”117 
The Fourth Circuit has effectively taken the challengers’ new 
approach a step further, grafting a retrogression standard onto Section 
2’s intent prong. While the inference of discrimination drawn by the 
court is itself troubling, the court’s holding could potentially work to 
harm minority voting interests. Legislators may henceforth ignore data 
concerning minority use of voting mechanism, lest they be accused of 
intentional discrimination in the event their votes negatively impact 
minority voting preferences. All branches of government should be 
encouraged to consult all relevant data sources before making changes 
that could affect voting rights. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion does the 
opposite. 
The State of North Carolina sought review by the Supreme Court. 
And  although  the  Fourth  Circuit  did  not  address  Section 2’s “result”  
 
 113.  Id. at 470.   
 114.  Id. at 241. 
 115.  Id. at 215. 
 116.  Id. at 214. 
 117.  Id. 
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prong, the State asked the Supreme Court to resolve the following 
issues: 
Whether a federal court has the authority to reimpose, under §2 of 
the Voting Rights Act, the same “anti-retrogression” preclearance 
standard invalidated as to §5 by Shelby County. . . 
Whether statistical racial disparities in the use of voting mechanisms 
or procedures are relevant to a vote denial claim under §2.118 
However, whether the Supreme Court will even have a chance to 
provide guidance on the aforementioned issues remains unclear. As of 
the date of this article, the North Carolina Attorney General has moved 
to dismiss its petition for a writ of certiorari.119 In response, the North 
Carolina General Assembly has moved to be added as a petitioner for 
purposes of defending SL 2013-381.120 
CONCLUSION 
Whether through the North Carolina case or subsequent litigation, 
the Supreme Court will likely have to decide which version of Section 
2 is correct. But the answer involves an issue more complicated than 
simple statutory interpretation. As Justice Thomas recognized, 
“Federal oversight of state election practices is a matter than risks 
exacting “significant federalism costs.”121 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of Section 2 implicates competing Constitutional 
prerogatives— the power of the states to govern their elections and the 
power of the Federal Government to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment. Whatever the Court’s answer, that balance of power will 
be affected in a way that will shape our country’s elections for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
 118.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, State of North Carolina v. North Carolina State 
Conference of the NAACP, No. 16-833 (Dec. 27, 2016). 
 119.  Motion to Dismiss Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, North Carolina v. North Carolina 
State Conference of the NAACP, No. 16-833 (Feb. 21, 2017).  
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 293 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (collecting 
cases discussing this issue). 
